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Abstract 
This paper thus addresses two primary issues. What is the relationship between 
the types of electoral systems that have been used to govern initial elections in the 
democratizing states of Africa and the degree to which party systems volatility has 
emerged?  What other factors impact on the levels of volatility? I examine the above 
questions using data from 31 African countries.  I find that most of the factors often cited 
as impacting on party systems development do not account for the level of legislative 
volatility. However, the dominance of the ruling party in the first election following 
democratic transition does impact the extent of legislative volatility later. Nonetheless 
these cases are also less likely to lead to democratic or politically stable outcomes 
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In recent years there has emerged a great deal of scholarly attention to the 
relationship between political institutions and political party development among third 
wave democratizing states. Although there has been some literature  that examines the 
determinative effects of political institutions (such as electoral systems) on party systems 
generally in Africa  and elsewhere1, most of this work has focused almost exclusively on 
the number of parties rather than the degree to which stable party systems have emerged. 
Although there has been some work on party systems volatility on Latin America and 
post communist Eastern Europe2  there has been relatively little consideration of the 
relationship between electoral systems and party systems volatility in Africa. 
 This is relatively surprising given that most  scholars agree that the development 
of stable, coherent representative parties which can shape and channel popular  references 
is crucial to successful democratization in the wake of political transition.  Moreover, a 
widely held view is that  widespread party systems instability militates against successful 
democratic consolidation. Indeed, excessive instability undermines the basis for political 
representation. Party systems volatility, though less studied than the number of parties in 
the party system, is arguably just as important. Mainwaring and Scully consider  
volatility as a singularly important dimension of political institutionalization.3 They argue 
that, when electoral volatility is high, “democratic politics is more erratic, establishing 
legitimacy is more difficult, and governing more complicated.”  When parties come and 
go at the whim of sudden and violent shifts in electoral coalitions, increasing the chances 
of populists coming to power and generating high levels of uncertainty for voters, who 
struggle to make informed choices about electoral choices and hold politicians 
accountable for their performance in office. For parties in power, uncertain if they will be 
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around tomorrow, time horizons are shortened, making it less likely that politicians will 
engage in reform projects that may engender short term pains. 
More specifically, according to Sarah Birch a consistently high level of party 
system instability has four main consequences that are detrimental to democratic 
consolidation.4 
 
1. It reduces accountability – voters cannot ‘throw the rascals out’ if the rascals no longer 
exist as a unified group. 
 
2. It impedes party institutionalization by decreasing the level of long-term commitment 
which politicians, activists, and voters have to ‘their’ party. 
 
3. It significantly increases uncertainty, hampering the ability of politicians and voters to 
engage in strategically-driven co-ordination 
 
4. It raises the stakes of the electoral game. This may have the consequence of weakening 
the democratic commitment of politicians who may seek other ways to insure themselves 
against possible political loss at the next election.  
 
The successful consolidation of democracy thus requires enough uncertainty to keep 
losers in the political game, but not so much that elections become a lottery. 
On the other hand, extremely low volatility can also be a problem, especially 
when it is symptomatic of permanent exclusion of one portion of the electorate from 
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power.5 Lack of turnover may also indicate the entrenchment of  patronage links. 
Moreover under such conditions, incumbency advantages can become ever more 
entrenched, making it even less likely that the opposition will have access, thus inviting 
“exit” using Albert Hirschman’s term.6 Exclusion can lead to a hardening of opposition 
and increasing embitterment regarding democracy with the opposition viewing it as the  
tyranny of a fixed majority, not a pluralism consistent with democracy.7 In sum, too 
much electoral volatility can be a bad thing, but so can too little. Further, larger  and more 
dominant parties might become increasingly complacent if there is little in the way of a 
threat to their continued dominance. As a result they will have less incentive to deliver 
positive outcomes to the electorate. 
This paper thus addresses two primary issues. What is the relationship between 
the types of electoral systems that have been used to govern initial elections in the 
democratizing states of Africa and the degree to which party systems volatility has 
emerged?  What other factors impact on the levels of volatility? I examine the above 
questions using data from 31 African countries.   
 
Literature 
Despite the increasing amount of literature on political parties in new democracies 
and transitional systems, studies of parties and party systems in post cold war Africa have 
not been particularly plentiful. In part this is due to the tentative nature of African 
democratization where many have questioned the depth and significance of the regime 
changes which have taken place during the ‘third wave’ . Claude Ake, for instance has  
observed that multi-party elections provided well known autocrats with the opportunity to 
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engage in a democratic “credentialing process.” 8 Crawford Young, as well notes that “In 
only a handful of instances can one speak with reasonable confidence of a beginning of 
consolidation . . .”.9 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle lament that the weaknesss 
of political parties in  Africa ‘bodes poorly for the consolidation of democracy.’10  
However, as Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright note,  “even if the prospects for 
democratic consolidation do not seem especially propitious, most do not dispute the 
importance of the recent wave of democratic liberalizations and transitions.”11  Thus. they 
argue, factors such as the development of the party system, the extent to which political 
volatility occurs, that directly impacts on democratic consolidation “are of acute 
interest.”12  
As much of the empirical literature has indicated, the newer democracies of the 
developing world have had higher levels of volatility than the older democracies of 
Europe and North America. Mainwaring and Scully show that legislative volatility in 
Latin America has been much higher, on average, than volatility in Europe.13  Mean 
legislative volatility for Latin America for the 1960-89 period (for some countries, a 
smaller period) was 24 percent. In comparison Bartolini and Mair’s  data for Europe 
(1885-1985), shows that the highest single case for 303 election periods was 32 percent 
in Weimar Germany and the highest mean over all election periods was France, at 15 
percent.14 Jack Bielasiak has also demonstrated that volatility rates in the post communist  
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union (FSU) are considerably higher than either Latin 
America and Western Europe: average volatility for East Central Europe and Southeast 
Europe was around 20 percent, for the Baltic states, around 31 percent, and for FSU 
Europe, around 42 percent.15 Kuenzi and Lambright demonstrated that average legislative 
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volatility in Africa has been quite high in the 1990s, at 28 percent, with several countries 
exceeding 50 percent.16 
Despite the considerable literature on volatility, relatively little work has focused 
on the relationship between electoral rules, ethnic cleavages, transitional elections and 
party systems volatility. Indeed most of the literature on the relationship between 
electoral laws and ethnicity have focused largely on explaining the number of political 
parties in a system as opposed to the degree of systems volatility. For instance, many 
comparative studies of  electoral laws and ethnicity have  found that   the effective 
number of parties in a country is jointly affected by the electoral rules and the ethnic 
heterogeneity of a country Ordeshook and Shvetsova , Neto and Cox , and Cox.17 Small 
magnitude systems (like those with single member plurality rules) tend to produce only a 
small number of parties, even in ethnically diverse countries.  However, the number of 
parties in more Proportional Representation systems depends on the degree of diversity: 
heterogeneous countries tend to support large numbers of parties, while homogeneous 
ones tend to produce relatively few. 
More recently, a very good analysis by  Mozaffer, Scarritt, and Galaich  examined 
the relationship between electoral laws and ethnicity  for African countries.18 In this 
work, they presented a new measure (introduced by Daniel Posner19), one that focuses on 
“politically relevant” ethnicity (identities that have been politicized) rather than just the 
commonly used ethnolinguistic fragmentation index, and second, they also consider 
ethnic geographic concentration as a variable as well. These innovations led to some very 
interesting findings, at  least regarding Africa.  Ethnic fragmentation on its own reduces 
the number of parties in the party system, rather than increasing it. This effect is 
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mitigated by the  extent of the geographic concentration of ethnic groups and district 
magnitudes. Indeed, countries with large district magnitudes, high ethnic fragmentation, 
and low geographic concentration have few parties, while countries with large district 
magnitudes, high fragmentation, and high geographic concentration have large numbers 
of parties. 
 How might this literature  relate to the extent of party systems volatility? 
Generally we can conceive of  party systems volatility as resulting from the entrance of 
new competitors into the political market (which may reduce the vote share of existing 
parties) and  the exit of other parties (through dissolution and defection). Thus, one might 
expect that the factors that promote party systems fragmentation would also tend to make 
for greater levels of party systems volatility. For instance, the existence of high district 
magnitudes (or the average number of seats per district) which for Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova represent more “permissive” electoral systems would promote greater 
volatility in that it provide incentives for new competitors to enter the political market.20 
This would also suggest that lower district magnitude systems would reduce the openings 
in the political market, and hence reduce the levels of volatility.  On the other hand since 
party systems volatility is also a function of parties dropping out of the political market 
(which may result from mass defections and reforming of parties, as individual elites seek 
better opportunities for office seeking), then it may be the case that systems with lower 
district magnitudes (particularly single member district systems) would promote greater 
incentives for defections and hence greater party systems volatility (see the work of 
Frank Thames and Erik  Herron for instance). This is also suggested by Kuenzi and 
Lambright when they speculate that  countries with plurality single-member districts 
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should have very high volatility scores, while those with large, multimember districts and 
proportional representation should have lower volatility scores.21 However contrary to 
this expectation, they found that district magnitude (as a measure of the proportionality of 
the system was not related to the legislative volatility scores. 
 Another institutional feature that theoretically impacts on the extent to which new 
entrants enter the political market (thus affecting party systems volatility) is whether the 
political system is presidential or not.22 This is because Presidential systems provide an 
incentive for existing parties to form broad umbrella parties that seek to accommodate 
new entrants into the political market. Thus there should be less volatility as these broad 
umbrella parties seek to control and coopt newly activated political interests.  
 An additional factor that may militate against the entrance of new competitors 
into the political  market is the continued dominance of the ruling  party even after the 
first competitive elections. For Mainwaring and Scully, this represents the  ‘hegemonic 
party system in transition’  where the ruling party in the pre first election period 
maintains its dominance through the first elections. These systems may in fact prevent 
wide swings in terms of party systems volatility because that ‘the existence of old, well-
established, and well-organized parties means that in some respects the process of 
institutionalizing a party system is more advanced than in several countries that already 
have competitive politics.’23 However, they point out that the continued dominance of 
hegemonic parties also constrains viable competitors and hence often leads to less than 
democratic (or ultimately politically stable) outcomes. 
Ethnic fragmentation  may also lead to greater levels of volatility given that, as 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova  suggest, ethnically fragmented societies tend to promote large 
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numbers of parties (particularly under conditions of proportional representation electoral 
systems).24 However as Mozzafer, Scarritt and Galaich suggest, at least generally in the 
case of Africa, ethnic fragmentation reduces the number of parties, hence reducing the 
degree of volatility (especially where ethnic groupings are geographically 
concentrated).25 In part this finding can be explained by reference to the work of  
Kanchan Chandra  who notes that ethnicity provides for fairly stable constituencies for 
political parties, so once party politics have been “ethnified” there is little reason to think 
that there would be frequent changes in the composition of the political market in terms 
of competitors.26 
 Another factor that provides an incentive for the entrance of new competitors in 
the political market is the extent to which there are patronage resources for distribution to 
political followers by elites. This is suggested by Chandra  in her discussion of  patronage 
democracy27, and also by scholars on Africa who have noted the impact of state 
ownership and neo patrimonialism.28  Access to office provides for access to large 
amounts of patronage resources  (such as oil revenues in some cases) and thus provides 
an enormous incentive for new entrants into the political market.  
 Finally, the extent to which a state as been exposed to globalization may also 
impact on the mobilization of new entrants into the political market, particularly under 
the conditions of ethnic fragmentation. As  Joel Kotkin argues, economic globalization is 
breeding a new wave of ethnic awareness in reaction to the homogenizing influences of 
the global culture.29  This “great revival” of ethnic identity would promote prosperity for 
some groups, but for many others globalization would produce a “....throwback to the 
bases kind of clannishness...increased emphasis on religion and ethnic culture often 
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suggest the prospect of a humanity breaking itself into narrow, exclusive and hostile 
groups.”30 Naisbitt  envisioned that globalization would lead to the growth of a new 
“tribalism” particularly a “belief in the fidelity of one’s own kind.”31 The greater 
integration of economies has led to smaller productive units and the revolution in 
telecommunications has provided the means for ethnic groups to coordinate their actions 
and  enter the political market. 
 In sum, then, the literature on both party systems volatility in general, and the 
literature on political parties in Africa in the 1990s suggest that  party systems volatility 
is a function of  the “permissiveness” of the electoral system (i.e. the ease by which new 
entrants can enter the political market) the extent of ethnolinguistic fragmentation, the 
extent of state control over economic resources, the initial hegemony of the ruling party 
at the time of the first election,  and the extent to which the country has been exposed to 
globalization forces that may activate new political forces, particularly in ethnically 
divided societies. 
 
Methodology 
In this study, I examine 31 African countries that have had at least two multiparty 
legislative elections up until 2004.  The data set is similar to Kuenzi and Lambright’s data 
in that there is considerable overlap in terms of countries. However I include Nigeria and 
Ethiopia (absent from their data set) and exclude South Africa. South Africa is excluded 
from this sample because arguably the Republic of South Africa is very different from 
any other sub-Saharan country. Further I update the volatility score by including all 
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elections up until 2004. Finally, in the data set I employ, I include several independent 
variables not used in the Kuenzi and Lambright study. 
In the sample are included several  countries that have undergone only very recent 
transitions to democracy, where no alternation of power has ever occurred, and the 
competitiveness of the elections and extent to which political rights and liberties are 
extended to the citizenry are questionable at best. However I included these countries 
because it  helps to establish a baseline for future analysis of trends in the direction of 
democratization and democratic consolidation processes. The 31 cases as well as the 
values of the primary independent variables are reported in Table 1. 
As with previous studies like Kuenzi and Lambright’s,  I employ the often used 
Pedersen’s index of volatility to calculate legislative volatility 31 African cases. 
Pedersen’s index measures the net change in each party’s seat  share in the lower house 
of the legislature from election to election. It is calculated by summing the net changes in 
the percentage of seats won or lost by all of the parties from election to election and 
dividing by two.32 The resulting score for each country is an average score across each of 
the legislative periods for each country. The focus of both the dependent and several of 
the independent variables is on legislative politics as opposed to presidential politics 
because as Joseph Schlesinger has noted, all party systems have grown out of 
legislatures, and despite the importance of presidencies, parties have emerged historically 
out of legislatures.33 
The independent variables include the log of the average district magnitude as a 
measure of the electoral system, calculated as the number of seats in the lower house of 
the legislature divided by the number of electoral districts34 and dummy variables for  
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whether the ruling party at the time of the first legislative election won the initial or 
founding election in the third wave transition election, and for whether or not the system 
was a presidential system.   
In addition, to political/institutional variables I also use the “political relevant 
ethnic group” (PREG) index developed by Posner using a weighted variation of the 
Herfindahl Index of Concentration, whose values range from 0-1, to measure the extent 
to which a country is ethnically fragmented.35 Further, I employ the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom  measure of  “government intervention in the 
economy.”36 This factor measures government's direct use of scarce resources for its own 
purposes and government's control over resources through ownership and ranges from 1 
to 5 where 1 has least government control over the economy, and 5 the most. The 
measure comprises both government consumption and government production. Transfer 
payments (the difference between government expenditure and government 
consumption), which consist of compulsory exchange of the rights to resources from 
some people to others, are excluded from this measure. Finally to measure the extent to 
which a country is subject to external global economic pressures I use the often employed 
measure of Foreign Direct Investment per Gross Domestic Product, from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).37  
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Table 1: Data on 31 African States 
COUNTRY PERIOD 
# electoral 
periods 
Legislative 
Volatility 
District 
Magnitude FDI/GDP 
Stability 
Score Polity 2 
ruling party 
victory dummy  
Presidential 
System dummy 
Intervention 
Gov’t PREG 
Benin 1991-03 3 50.83 3.46 2.14 .50 6.00 .00 1.00 4.00 0.30 
Botswana 1969–04 7 10.00 1.00 .89 -.26 8.75 1.00 0.00 4.50 0.00 
Burkina Faso 1992–02 2 24.85 7.92 .34 .77 -2.78 1.00 1.00 2.50 0.00 
Cameroon 1993–02 2 31.75 3.10 .23 -.66 -4.00 1.00 1.00 3.25 0.71 
Cape Verde 1991–01 2 9.88 4.50 2.82 .81  .00 1.00 2.50 0.26 
CAR 1993–98 1 16.00 3.89 .19 -.61 4.33 .00 1.00 4.00 0.23 
Comoros 1992–04 4 70.00 1.00 .19 -.19 1.88 .00 1.00  0.00 
Congo 1992–02 2 32.23 1.00 5.60 -1.52 -3.00 .00 1.00 4.50 0.19 
Côte d’Ivoire 1990–00 2 24.67 1.44 1.54 -.64 -1.89 1.00 1.00 3.75 0.49 
Djibouti 1992–03 2 17.83 13.00 .51 -.69 -1.67 1.00 1.00 2.75 0.80 
Ethiopia 1995-00 1 2.60 1.00 1.11 -.60 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.50 0.57 
Equatorial Guinea 1993–04 2 14.20 14.29 36.70 .31 -5.00 1.00  3.50 0.44 
Gabon 1990–01 2 14.38 13.33 -1.38 -.23 -4.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.21 
Gambia 1966–02 7 8.30 1.00 5.08 .51 -5.33 1.00 1.00 2.75 0.37 
Ghana 1992–04 3 23.40 1.00 1.79 -.08 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.50 0.44 
Kenya 1992–03 2 24.45 1.00 .32 -.79 -.36 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.57 
Lesotho 1993–02 2 64.43 1.48 14.00 .63 5.78 .00 0.00 3.75 0.00 
Madagascar 1993–02 2 53.04 1.38 .85 .00 7.55 .00 1.00 1.50 0.00 
Malawi 1994–04 2 12.40 1.00 .59 .19 6.44 .00 1.00 3.75 0.55 
Mali 1992–02 2 41.03 1.18 1.94 .26 6.22 .00 1.00 3.25 0.13 
Mauritania 1992–01 2 13.93 1.15 2.33 1.15 -6.00 1.00 1.00 3.50 0.33 
Mauritius 1976–00 7 69.35 3.33 1.08 .11 10.00 .00 0.00 2.00 0.60 
Namibia 1989–04 3 14.15 72.00 .88 .35 6.00 1.00 1.00 2.75 0.55 
Niger 1993–04 2 45.50 13.13 .56 -.22 1.56 1.00 1.00 3.50 0.51 
Nigeria 1999-03 1 10.05 1.00 3.57 -1.10 -2.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 0.66 
SaoTomé 1991–01 2 18.10 7.85 2.92 .56  .00 1.00  0.00 
Senegal 1983–01 4 19.28 4.00 1.29 -.76 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.50 0.14 
Seychelles 1993–02 2 23.63 1.31 6.71 1.06  1.00 1.00  0.00 
Togo 1994–02 2 46.38 1.00 1.76 -.54 -2.00 .00 1.00 3.50 0.49 
Zambia 1991–01 2 33.20 1.00 3.87 -.24 1.56 .00 1.00 2.50 0.71 
Zimbabwe 1980–05 5 20.23 1.00 1.12 -.80 -6.00 1.00 1.00 2.25 0.41 
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Analysis 
Table 2 reports the results of  regressing the dependent variable legislative 
volatility against the independent variables in three models. Model 1 is the full model 
which includes all of the independent variables. Models 2 and 3 include interactive 
variables, particularly the interaction between the number of ethnic groups and the 
electoral system (which was found to have an important impact on the number of parties 
by  Mozzafar et al)38 and an interactive variable between the PREG index and foreign 
direct investment (as a rough measure of globalization) which has been suggested above 
as having an important impact on the party system in new democracies.  
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics 
 Dependent Variable Legislative Volatility 
 
Full Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
[Beta] 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
[Beta] 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
[Beta] 
ruling party won first election? -18.68** 
(6.77) 
[-.52] 
-19.56** 
(6.28) 
[-.55] 
-20.00** 
(6.06) 
[-.56] 
presidential dummy variable -7.24 
(9.24) 
[-.15] 
-8.98 
(8.51) 
[-.18] 
-7.74 
(8.74) 
[-.16] 
log of district magnitude 2.24 
(3.01) 
[.14] 
  
politically relevant ethnic group 1.50 
(13.60) 
[.02] 
  
Average Economic Freedom Index 
Government Intervention Score 
1995-2003 
-2.95 
(4.26) 
[-.13] 
-2.64 
(3.95) 
[-.12] 
-2.42 
(3.86) 
[-.11] 
foreign direct investment as 
proportion of GDP 1990-03 
1.24 
(1.32) 
[.20] 
  
PREG X District Magnitude  -.01 
(4.13) 
[-.01] 
 
PREG X FDI   -3.60 
(4.61) 
[-.14] 
* p<  .10 Adjusted R2 = .21 Adjusted R2 = .24 Adjusted R2 = .26 
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** p<  .05 
N= 31 
  
 
 The results  in Table 2 indicate that of all of the independent variables, the only 
one that is statistically significant and in the correctly predicted direction is the dummy 
variable for whether or not the ruling party won the first competitive legislative election. 
As indicated,  if the ruling party won, this significantly reduced the level of legislative 
volatility later. Further, as indicated by the beta weights across all three models this 
variable had the greatest weight in explaining the level of legislative volatility across the 
31 cases. On the other hand, none of the other independent variables, including the 
interactive variables in both models 2 and 3 exhibited a statistically significant 
relationship with the level of legislative volatility. Further, none of the variables exhibited 
high levels of multicollinearity – after examination  all of the Variance Inflation Factor or 
VIF scores were less than 2(not reported in Table 2). 
 The above result indicates that the key variable explaining legislative volatility is 
whether or not the ruling party at the time of the first competitive election  won the 
election. This supports the findings of Mainwaring and Scully who argued that the 
persistence of such hegemonic parties would prevent high degree of legislative volatility, 
and in a way help  promote some degree of party systems institutionalization. However, 
they also pointed out that the continued dominance of hegemonic parties may also lead to 
less democratic and ultimately less politically stable outcomes. 
 To examine this claim, in Tables 3 and 4, I cross tabulate whether or not the 
ruling party at the time of the first competitive election by the level of political 
democracy (Table 3) and by the level of political stability (Table 4). The level of political 
democracy is taken from the Polity IV data base  for the combined autocracy/democracy 
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score. The scores range from -12 to 12 and is calculated for each year. I take the scores 
for each of the 31 countries and calculate an average polity score from 1995-2003 
(generally after the initial elections). Then I bifurcate this into two categories, where the 
average polity score is negative or positive.  The level of stability is taken from the study 
conducted by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi.39 The measure is based upon several 
components including violence, governmental stability and perceptions of risk (for a 
detailed description of the index see Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi). The scores range 
from -2.5 (most unstable) to +2.5 (most stable). I take the scores from years between 
1996 and 2002, calculate an average score, and then bifurcate this score into negative and 
positive categories. 
Table 3: Crosstabulation, Polity 2 score by whether Ruling Party won first election 
 Ruling Party did not 
win first election 
Ruling Party won 
First election 
Total 
Average Polity2 
score 1990-2002 
negative 
Congo, Togo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
(18.2%) 
Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, The Gambia, 
Kenya, Mauritania, 
Nigeria 
 Zimbabwe 
    11 
(64.7%) 
12 
Average Polity2 
score 1990-2002 
positive 
Benin, CAR, 
Comoros, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Malawi, Mauritius, 
Zambia 
9 
(81.8%) 
Botswana, Ethiopia, 
Ghana 
Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal 
 
6 
(35.3%) 
15 
 11 17 28 
 
 Table 3 indicates that in countries where the ruling parties won the first election, 
these countries were much less likely to become democracies later. Indeed only  six out 
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of seventeen (35.3%) of the countries where the ruling party won the first elections 
scored in the positive range of the POLITY IV (2005)  index40, as compared to 81.8% of 
countries where the ruling party did not win the first elections. Further Table 4 indicates 
that countries where the ruling party won in the first election were less politically stable 
later. Only  thirty-three percent  of the countries where the ruling parties won the first 
election scored in the positive range of the political stability index, whereas 61.5% of 
countries where the ruling parties lost the election scored in the positive range of the 
political stability index. Thus, these results also support the observations made by 
Mainwaring and Scully, that, although hegemonic parties might forestall legislative 
volatility they do not necessarily forestall political instability, nor promote democratic 
consolidation. 
Table 4: Crosstabulation, Political Stability Score by  
Whether Ruling Party won first election 
 Ruling Party did not 
win first election 
Ruling Party won 
First election 
Total 
Average Political 
Stability score 1996-
2002 
Negative 
CAR. Comoros, 
Congo, Togo, 
Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
(38.5%) 
Botswana, 
Cameroon, 
Cote D’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Kenya, 
Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Zimbabwe  
12 
(66.7%) 
16 
Average Political 
Stability score 1996-
2002 
Positive 
Benin, Cape Verde, 
Lesotho, 
Madagascar Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Sao 
Tome 
 
 8 
(61.5%) 
Burkina Faso, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
The Gambia, 
Mauritania, 
Namibia, Seychelles 
 
6 
(33.3%) 
14 
Total 13 18 31 
 
 
 17 
Conclusion 
 The above results generally do not support much of the literature on party systems 
development in new democracies. Although there are several factors that may explain the 
number of political parties in newly emerging party systems in Africa, these factors (e.g. 
the characteristics of the electoral system, the extent of ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization, government intervention in to the economy, and globalization) nor 
interactions between these variables impact upon the degree of party system volatility. 
However, the dominance of the ruling party in the first election following democratic 
transition does impact the extent of legislative volatility later. As I demonstrated above 
these cases are also less likely to lead to democratic or politically stable outcomes. 
 Although generally these results might indicate that hegemonic party systems in 
Africa will ultimately produce unstable and undemocratic results (which is very much in 
keeping with the tradition of consociationalism that emphasizes inclusion of opposition 
groups, particularly ethnically based ones) could it be that hegemonic ruling parties can 
lead to more democracy and political stability later? Certainly this is suggested  by the 
Mexican and Turkish cases (and for that matter even the Japanese case) where the 
political process was dominated by a hegemonic party that this  ultimately paved the way 
for democratic consolidation later. In Africa, this might be suggested by the Ethiopian 
case, for example, with the victory of the EPDRF (the ruling party that had seized power 
after the overthrow of the Derg in 1991,  in the first election in 1995 and 1999). Indeed, 
Ethiopia scores relatively high in the POLITY IV index and respectably on the stability 
index (+1 and -.8 respectively). Moreover, if one examines the trends since 1995, the 
stability scores and Polity scores are moving in more stable and democratic directions.  
 18 
Other cases, such as  Botswana and Ghana, are similar to the Ethiopian case in this 
regard, which  might also suggest that the victory of the hegemonic party may not 
necessarily  lead to unstable political outcomes. Perhaps the key is whether the ruling 
party that wins the first election is institutionalized (as I think is the case with the EPDRF 
in Ethiopia, the BDP in Botswana or the NDC  in Ghana). 
 Whatever the case, much more work needs to be done on how individual parties 
develop in Africa. Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere (in studies particularly on post 
communist politics)41 that the extent to which party systems stabilize depends heavily on 
whether individual parties in the party system become institutionalized and can act as 
gatekeepers for those who aspire to enter the political market. This, however, is currently 
beyond the scope of this particular study, and any claims in support of this supposition 
must wait until further empirical work is done. 
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